Abstract: We investigate whether food price subsidies affect household nutrition using a dramatic expansion of the availability of subsidized rice in the Indian state of Chhattisgarh in the early 2000's. Households in Chhattisgarh improved their nutritional intake relative to households in districts bordering the state as the availability of subsidized rice expanded. This increase is driven by households most likely to be eligible for rice subsidies, and we do not find evidence that households least likely to be eligible changed their diet. These results differ from recent studies suggesting that food subsidies may have little effect on nutrition.
Introduction
Despite widespread improvements in the availability and stability of food supplies, recent estimates suggest there are still between 700 and 870 million malnourished people in the world (FAO 2012a; Fan 2012; Meade and Rosen 2013) . Given the difficulties faced by many households in obtaining adequate sustenance, considerable attention has been devoted to measuring different aspects of malnourishment (FAO 2012b) , analyzing methods to better deliver food assistance (e.g., Barrett 2002) , and estimating the effects of food assistance on households (e.g., Deolalikar 1988, Barrett 2002 ).
This article examines the effect of a large, grains subsidy in India on nutrition. We obtain information about the quantity of foods consumed in each household from large consumer expenditure surveys conducted by the government of India, and we map this to nutritional outcomes using the average nutritional content of foods common to the Indian diet. The baseline specifications focus on the effect the grains subsidy had on total protein consumption.
A high proportion of children and adults suffer from moderate and severe grades of protein-calorie malnutrition as observed in anthropometric indicators (e.g., Indian Council on Medical Research 2009), and thus a higher consumption of protein would unambiguously improve the health of the average Indian household. Additionally, in a number of settings, nutrient consumption is more responsive to economic shocks than energy consumption (e.g., Block et al. 2004; Brinkman et al. 2009 ). However, specifications are also estimated that analyze total energy consumption, and the consumption of a number of other beneficial nutrients.
The effect of in-kind food aid on nutrition is theoretically ambiguous. Provided households are inframarginal-the amount of in-kind aid is less than what households actually consume-the effect of in-kind aid should be identical to an unconditional cash transfer.
Households will increase their consumption of more nutritious food items if they are normal goods. Alternatively, consumption of these items could remain constant if households instead choose to increase their consumption of non-food goods or food items with less nutritious content, such as processed foods (Behrman and Deolalikar 1989) .
A number of studies suggest that food price subsidies have little effect on nutrition in developing countries. Using experimental evidence from China, Jensen and Miller (2011) find little evidence of any nutritional response to subsidizing staple foods. Rather, the authors find some evidence that households substitute toward foods without better nutrition or non-food goods. Tarozzi (2005) examines a decrease in the food grains subsidy in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh and finds little evidence of an effect on the nutrition of children less than four years of age.
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The dietary effects of food price subsidies are particularly important in India. India contains nearly forty percent of the world's food-insecure population (FAO 2012a) . This is despite the fact that India spends nearly one percent of its GDP on maintaining its food assistance program, the Public Distribution System (PDS) (Sharma 2012) . This issue has become even more salient with the recent passage of the National Food Security Act (NFSA), which will dramatically expand the distribution of subsidized food grains in India. Despite this large, projected increase in expenditure on food aid, previous research provides no evidence that expanding the PDS in its current form will improve calorie consumption or diet quality in India (Kaushal and Muchomba 2013, Tarozzi 2005) .
In order to estimate the nutritional effects of food price subsidies, we examine reforms 1 Other studies of the effects of food price subsidies in developing countries on food consumption include: Gavan and Chandrasekera (1979) ; Alderman and von Braun (1984) ; Edirisinghe (1987) ; Kennedy and Alderman (1987); and Alderman, Chaudhry, and Garcia (1988) . These studies compare participants to non-participants and cannot account for selection biases that prevent identification of the effects of such programs on nutrition.
In contrast to Chhattsgarh, aside from the national reforms, there appear to have been no major PDS reforms during the same time period in states that border ChhattisgarhAndhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, and Uttar Pradesh. We exploit this difference by comparing changes in diet choice in Chhattisgarh to changes in districts that border Chhattisgarh between 1999 Chhattisgarh between /2000 Chhattisgarh between and 2004 Chhattisgarh between /2005 . Just prior to its formation, average household consumption of PDS rice calories in Chhattisgarh was approximately one third that of households in districts neighboring the state. However, following the PDS reforms, the percentage of households consuming PDS rice in Chhattisgarh nearly doubled from 10 percent to 19 percent, and the average amount consumed increased by over 400 percent. In contrast, PDS consumption in neighboring districts was essentially unchanged on average during this period (Krishnamurthy, Pathania, and Tandon 2014) .
In an earlier article (Krishnamurthy, Pathania, and Tandon 2014) published in a widely circulated news weekly, we presented a series of stylized facts that were intended to inform the policy debate over the PDS in India. Chhattisgarh has been lauded as an example of successful PDS reform, and most observers attribute its perceived success in improving the PDS to initiatives taken by the Raman Singh government after 2004 (Puri 2012 ). However, we documented the fact that PDS rice consumption in Chhattisgarh higher for households in Chhattisgarh. Furthermore, we find that the growth in protein consumption is driven by households most likely to have ration cards that entitle them to the largest PDS subsidies, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that households that are least likely to possess ration cards did not change their diet relative to households in border districts. Additionally, we find evidence of households that are most likely to have ration cards also significantly increased overall calorie consumption relative to border districts, while we also cannot reject the hypothesis that households least likely to hold ration cards did not change their diet relative to households in border districts.
We rule out a number alternative channels for our findings. Most importantly, the lack of a change in diet in households least likely to be eligible for subsidies suggests that the results are not likely to be driven by the advent of statehood and improvements in overall governance for the entire population in Chhattisgarh. Additionally, there were national reforms to the PDS that gradually increased the available ration in all states, and these reforms potentially affect the identification of the effect of the Chhattisgarh reforms.
These reforms had differential effects on border districts from different states based on whether the state provided more than the basic ration prior to the national reforms, and the states' ability to distribute the additional rations. However, the additional reforms in Chhattisgarh, combined with the poor pre-reform coverage of the PDS, caused the increase in food grain subsidies to be much larger in Chhattisgarh than in border districts from any other state. Furthermore, the baseline patterns continue to hold when we restrict border districts to states to those from states where rations were larger than the provision by the central government, to those from states where grains were not efficiently distributed and the increase in rations had very little effect on actual PDS consumption, and to those where the national reforms resulted in larger PDS consumption, albeit by much less than in Chhattisgarh.
This article adds to the literature analyzing the effects of food price subsidies on diet quality and consumption. In particular, our results are releated to Jensen and Miller (2011) , who find no evidence of a nutritional response to food price subsidies using experimental evidence in China. This difference in findings could be a result of the nature of the subsidy. Jensen and Miller (2011) consider price subsidies for staple grains in an amount that exceeds what households would normally consume (i.e., households are not inframarginal), and thus their context involves both income and substitution effects. In contrast, the PDS rations that we consider are less than what households would normally consume, and thus this setting focuses on income effects. This difference could also stem from differences in the level of development of the treated populations. Households in Chhattisgarh that are entitled to the largest PDS subsidies are potentially less well-off than the poor Chinese households analyzed by Jensen and Miller (2011) .
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Our results also differ from studies that find no evidence for an effect of PDS consumption on malnutrition in India (Kochar 2005; Tarozzi 2005; Kaushal and Muchomba 2013) . Kaushal and Muchomba (2013) estimate the relationship between nutrition levels and the size of the PDS subsidy, and instrument for the size of the PDS subsidy with the estimated probability of having a BPL ration card. They find no effect of changes to the PDS in 2002 on nutrition in poorer and rural households.
3 However, the predictors of ration card status are correlated with a number of factors that also affect nutrition levels (e.g., wealth), thus it is difficult to attribute these changes solely to the size of the PDS subsidies.
Tarozzi (2005) finds no evidence that a decrease in PDS subsidies affects the weight of children under four. The differences between the results presented here and Tarozzi (2005) could be the result of a number of factors. First, we document a larger change in the availability of PDS food grains. Second, we are able to directly observe PDS participation and diet choice at the household level. Lastly, Tarozzi (2005) utilizes evidence from a state -Andhra Pradesh -in which the PDS functioned well, whereas we examine PDS expansion in a less-developed state where the PDS initially functioned poorly.
Furthermore, the results presented here are similar to those presented in Kaul (2014) , which estimates the nutritional impact of the PDS by utilizing variation in the size of the subsidies given differences in states in implementing the PDS, such as indexing
It is difficult to estimate the effect separately by wealth in the present setting. The poorest households are the only ones eligible for food price subsidies, and thus we see a larger effect for poorer households. However, we do not observe ration card status in the pre-survey, and thus we cannot estimate the effect separately by wealth for only households who are eligible for subsidies.
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They do find evidence that households that were more likely to be eligible for PDS subsidies increased their consumption of PDS rice and wheat and lowered their consumption of coarse grains relative to households that were less likely to be eligible for subsidies.
benefits to family size, and variation in local grains prices. However, it is difficult to interpret the effect such variation in the size of the subsidy has on nutrition given the joint determination of diet choice, state policies, family size, and agricultural prices.
These results also add to the literature describing the ability of the PDS to reach the poor and the implicit subsidies provided by the PDS (Dev and Suryanarayana 1991 , Howes and Jha 1992 , Ahluwalia 1993 , Parikh 1994 , Indrakanth 1997 , Radhakrishna et al. 1997 , Mooij 1999 , Dutta and Ramaswami 2001 .
Finally, this article is related to the literature analyzing the effects of in-kind food assistance on diet choice in developed countries. Utilizing natural experiments in the U.S., a number of studies find that in-kind food aid leads to higher expenditure on food consumed at home (Hoynes and Shazenbach 2009; Beatty and Tuttle 2015) . However, these studies are unable to identify the nutritional content of this increased spending, which is the primary focus of our analysis.
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The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the PDS; Section 3 describes the PDS reforms in the state of Chhattisgarh; Section 4 describes the data; Section 5 describes the estimation strategy and presents the results; Section 6 presents estimates of consumption changes by different types of ration cards; Section 7 presents a number of robustness checks; and Section 8 concludes.
The Public Distribution System
The PDS distributes a number of essential commodities to households across India.
These commodities primarily consist of food grains and kerosene. Prior to 1997, the program was available to almost all households, at least in principle, and was intended to stabilize food prices and provide food security (Radhakrishna et al. 1997) . Following 1997, the PDS was transformed into the Targeted Public Distribution System, which emphasized targeted food subsidies for the poorest households (Ministry of Consumer 4 There are also a number of studies that try to estimate the marginal impact of food stamp benefits on nutrient or food availability in the U.S. (Ranney and Kushman 1987; Fraker 1990; Devaney and Moffitt 1991; Levedahl 1991; Fraker, Martini, and Ohls 1995) . However, these studies do not rely on natural experiments and cannot account for selection issues that make such elasticities difficult to interpret. Important to our analysis, the number of BPL households in Chhattisgarh relative to states bordering Chhattisgarh is relatively stable during the time period under analysis.
Specifically, the size of the BPL population in each state was based on state-wise poverty estimates for 1993-1994, and was adjusted based on population growth in 19995 and 2000.
State governments are responsible for identifying the PDS entitlements of individual households and distributing PDS commodities through a network of Fair Price Shops (FPSs). State governments distribute ration cards to individual households, which entitle them to different quantities and rates of PDS food grains. In this article, we refer to all ration cards that receive the most preferential rates (Antyodaya and BPL cards) as "BPL" ration cards, and to all other ration cards as "other" ration cards. Households that do not have ration cards are not entitled to purchase PDS food grains. Although the relative size of the BPL population is stable, how those cards are distributed changes over time.
There are large differences in the PDS consumption patterns of households with BPL ration cards and households with other types of ration cards. BPL households generally consume high levels of PDS food grains, whereas non-BPL households have much lower These differences are likely driven by the significantly higher prices for PDS grains faced by households without BPL ration cards. PDS grain prices for these households can sometimes rise above the local market prices (Majumder 2001) . Because PDS food grains are generally viewed as inferior goods (Rao 2000; Majumder 2001 ), households without a BPL ration card only turn to PDS grains during times of economic distress when market prices increase. Consistent with this explanation, PDS consumption rose across the entire country following the global food price crisis and the global financial crisis (Krishnamurthy, Pathania, and Tandon 2014) .
The delivery of PDS food grains to households is inefficient in many states. Estimates Khera (2011b) estimates that households receive over ninety percent of their PDS ration on average, and that they do not receive low quality grains. Khera (2011a) also finds that there are only a handful of states in which the PDS continues to operate poorly and households purchase less than eighty percent of their ration on average. Although it is difficult to identify exactly how states turned around their distribution of PDS food grains, Khera (2011a) suggests that the improvement is in part due to PDS reforms in these states.
The PDS has been widely criticized. The Ministry of Consumer Affairs published a report criticizing the PDS along a number of dimensions: the types of commodities it provides, problems with targeting poor households, and the inability of a large number of poor and food-insecure households to obtain BPL rates (Ministry of Consumer Affairs 2002). In light of these concerns, many commentators have called for the government to fundamentally redesign its food assistance program (Basu 2011) . Other recommendations focus on improving the current system by removing APL subsidies for grains altogether and increasing the number of households entitled to BPL rates to avoid exclusion errors in targeting subsidies (Ministry of Consumer Affairs 2002).
PDS Reforms in Chhattisgarh between 2000 and 2004
Chhattisgarh instituted a number of reforms to improve the functioning of its PDS. Chhattisgarh rose from just under one million metric tons to just under two million metric tons, an increase of almost 100 percent (Figure 1) . However, importantly, the scheme offered the same MSP as is offered under centralized procurement, and the program likely did not have any significant income effects for Chhattisgarh farmers. (Khera 2011a (Khera , 2011b . Although these are sizeable increases in food price subsidies, the national reforms likely did not have as large of an effect as expected in a number of states that border
Chhattisgarh. First, during the time period, a large share of grains did not make it to beneficiaries in a number of states and were rather diverted to the market (Khera 2011a ). Thus, in the states where PDS grains were very inefficient (e.g., Jharkhand, Uttar Pradesh), there was little change in PDS consumption following the national reforms.
Second, other states were already providing rations above the quota before the national reforms (e.g., Andhra Pradesh, Orissa), and thus there was similarly little change in PDS consumption in those states (e.g., Dutta and Ramaswami 2001, Bedamatta 2006) .
Alternatively, the increase in household PDS consumption in Chhattisgarh (317 percent) far outpaced the increase in border districts contained in states where the national quota increase did increase PDS consumption: Madhya Pradesh (175 percent) and Maharashtra (111 percent). This difference is likely driven by two factors. First, the expansion of FPS's in Chhattisgarh that did not occur in neighboring states allowed beneficiaries to collect the original rations that they were unable to purchase. Second, the expansion of FPS's also allowed the state to distribute a higher share of the grains included in the quota increase, given still pervasive leakages in the PDS in both Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra (e.g., Khera 2011a).
Given potential variation in the degree of treatment in these three different groups, 
Data
In order to estimate the response of diet choice to PDS consumption, we utilize consumption data obtained from consumer expenditure surveys conducted by the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) in India. Each survey is a repeated cross-section and covers the entire country. The survey is stratified by geographical area and whether a household resides in a rural or urban area. After the primary stage units have been randomly selected, the survey is further stratified by household affluence. In the baseline estimates, we utilize the "thick" rounds conducted in 1999/2000 (55'th Round) and
2004/2005 (61'st Round).
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Each survey provides data on quantities and values of approximately 150 food items consumed over the past thirty days, and separately reports the amount of PDS rice, wheat, sugar, and kerosene consumed by each household. We utilize the 30-day reference period, as opposed to the 7-day reference period, for the 55'th round to make it comparable to the 61'st round. Each survey also reports a number of household characteristics and the district in which each household resides. From this data, we are able to estimate household calorie consumption from each source by utilizing nutritional information provided by Gopalan, Rama Sastri, and Balasubramanian (1989) , which is the source commonly used by the Government of India to estimate the nutritional content of consumption from NSSO data (e.g., National Sample Survey Organization 2007). Gopalan et al. (1989) provides nutritional information for 592 food items that are common in the Indian diet, which is a much finer level of detail than reported by the NSSO consumer expenditure survey.
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There are some differences between the two surveys used in the baseline analysis. Although both surveys provide information on the amount of PDS commodities consumed, only the survey conducted in 2004/2005 contains information on whether households have a ration card entitling them to purchase PDS food grains. The survey conducted in 1999/2000 did ask whether the lack of a ration card was the reason no PDS purchase was made in the prior 30 days. Unfortunately, the NSSO did not include this information on the publicly available data file. This difference between the surveys matters most in specifications in which changes in diet choice are estimated separately for households with different types of ration cards.
We use these surveys to compare nutrient consumption in Chhattisgarh, or districts in Madhya Pradesh that would later become Chhattisgarh, to nutrient consumption in districts that border the state. District boundaries change over time, so we utilize the boundaries in effect in 1999, the time the baseline survey (55'th Round) used in the empirical analysis was conducted. However, during the time period, one district was carved out of two existing districts. In this instance, the two districts were aggregated to a larger region to keep borders consistent across all surveys. The border districts come from a number of states: Andhra Pradesh (3), Jharkhand (3), Maharashtra (2), Madhya Pradesh (6), Odisha (8), and Uttar Pradesh (1).
12 Figure 2 presents a map of Chhattisgarh and districts that border the state. (61'st Round), this study also utilizes the "thick" round conducted in 1993/94 (50'th round), and utilizes the "thin" rounds conducted in 1997 (53'rd Round) and 1998 (54'th Round) to estimate trends in consumption prior to the formation of Chhattisgarh.
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Estimation Strategy and Baseline Results
Our identification strategy is to compare changes in nutrient consumption of households in Chhattisgarh to those of households in districts bordering the state that did not experience reforms. We utilize households in border districts to construct the counterfactual of consumption changes in Chhattisgarh in the absence of PDS reforms. Households in border districts are more likely to be similar to households in Chhattisgarh in terms of their unobserved characteristics than are households from the rest of India. Table 3 presents summary statistics for nutrient consumption and household characteristics for households in Chhattisgarh and those in border districts prior to the PDS reforms. Consistent with our assumption, column (3) shows that there are few observable differences between households in Chhattisgarh and border districts aside from PDS consumption.
We implement this identification strategy by estimating the following baseline specification: The coefficient of interest is γ, which gives the difference-in-differences estimate of the effect of PDS reforms on nutrient consumption. If the increased availability of PDS rice led to higher nutrient consumption in Chhattisgarh relative to border districts, then estimates of γ should be positive and significant. The baseline specification estimates robust standard errors clustered at the district level. To account for the possibility of state-level correlation in the error term, we also include p-values based on standard errors clustered at the state level. Given the small number of border states, we estimate the standard errors clustered at the state level it two ways: using the wild clusterbootstrap percentile-t method described in Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) , and using randomization inference, which is described in Cohen and Dupas (2010) . Table 4 reports these findings from the baseline specification. Column (1) estimates the simplest difference-in-differences specification; column (2) adds district fixed effects; and column (3) adds household-level control variables. The estimates are positive and similar in magnitude, and the precision increases with each refinement. In the most complete specification in column (3), households in Chhattisgarh increased their consumption of protein by 18.2% more than households in border districts. The results are qualitatively identical when clustering the standard errors at the state level.
15 Controls include indicators for whether a household resides in a rural area, indicators for whether a household is self-employed, indicators for household religion (Muslim, Christian, Hindu/Sikh/Jain/Buddhist), and indicators for whether a household belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, an indicator for whether the household belongs to an Otherwise Backward Class, the share of the household that is illiterate, an indicator equaling one if the household head is illiterate, an indicator equaling one if the spouse of the household head is illiterate, an indicator equaling one if the household head did not ever attend school, an indicator equaling one if the spouse of the household head did not ever attend school, and an indicator equaling one if the household head is married.
Chhattisgarh had higher growth in the consumption of a number of other beneficial nutrients. Columns (4) -(8) of Table 4 reports estimates of specifications using consumption of other nutrients as the dependent variable. In particular, total consumption of iron, calcium, and dietary minerals (manganese, copper, iodine, zinc, cobalt, fluoride, and selenium) significantly increased in Chhattisgarh relative to border districts.
However, the estimate of total calorie consumption was less precisely estimated. Thus, although calorie consumption increased in Chhattisgarh relative to border districts, one cannot reject the hypothesis that the change was identical in the two regions at standard levels of significance in specifications that use the entire sample of households from Chhattisgarh. 
Consumption Changes by Type of Subsidy
We separately estimate the growth of protein consumption in Chhattisgarh, relative to border districts, based on eligibility for PDS subsidies. However, we do not observe ration card status in the pre-round, and thus cannot observe the amount of food price subsidies to which each household is entitled. Thus, we rely on estimating the baseline specification separately for households based on their predicted probability of having a ration card. The estimated probability is derived using the estimated probability of having a ration card using predictors of ration card status in the post-round, where we do observe ration card status of each household.
Specifically, we estimate the probability of a household having a BPL ration card using a probit specification in the 2004/5 survey, where the set of control variables in the 16 The increase in calorie consumption in Chhattisgarh was less robust than the increase in other nutrients (protein, dietary minerals, and calcium) because households reduced consumption of oils. Oils typically used in Indian diets are rich in calories and fat, but contain no other beneficial nutrients (Gopalan et al. 1989) . Consistent with poorer households using more oils in food preparation than richer households to maintain adequate calorie consumption, in specifications not reported, we find that oil consumption increases with expenditure across all of India, but at a rapidly declining rate. The rate is declining quickly enough such that the correlation is positive for households below the median non-food expenditure, and the correlation is negative for households above the median non-food expenditure.
baseline specification are used as predictors of ration card status.
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We then use these fitted values to estimate the probability of ration card status in both the 1999/2000 and 2004/5 surveys.
Utilizing these estimates, we re-estimate the baseline specification separately for each quintile of predicted probabilities. The estimates are presented in columns (1)-(5) of Table   5 . Columns (1)- (2) demonstrate that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the changes in protein consumption in Chhattisgarh and border districts were identical for the two quintiles that were least likely to be entitled to the largest PDS subsidies. However, the estimates in columns (3)- (5) demonstrate that changes in protein consumption in the baseline specification were driven by the three quintiles most likely to be entitled to the largest subsidies. The point estimates are all higher than those presented in columns (1) and (2), and the estimates are more precisely estimated.
In addition to proxying for ration card ownership in the pre-period, we also compare protein consumption by type of ration card in the post-survey to average consumption in the pre-survey. We estimate the baseline specification while restricting post-observations to households with BPL ration cards, and all households without a BPL card. For these specifications, γ measures the difference between the average protein consumption for ration card holders in the post-survey and the average for all households in the pre-survey in Chhattisgarh relative to border districts.
However, restricting the sample in the post-period by type of ration card requires additional assumptions to produce unbiased difference-in-differences estimates. To see what those conditions might be, we first derive the estimate of our ideal specification where we can identify BPL card holders in both the pre and post-periods. Specifically, we would have computed the following double difference estimator for the BPL sample:
17 Controls include indicators for whether a household resides in a rural area, indicators for whether a household is self-employed, indicators for household religion (Muslim, Christian, Hindu/Sikh/Jain/Buddhist), and indicators for whether a household belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, an indicator for whether the household belongs to an Otherwise Backward Class, the share of the household that is illiterate, an indicator equaling one if the household head is illiterate, an indicator equaling one if the spouse of the household head is illiterate, an indicator equaling one if the household head did not ever attend school, an indicator equaling one if the spouse of the household head did not ever attend school, and an indicator equaling one if the household head is married.
18 See Appendix 2 for the estimates from this specification.
Here, Y s t,i is the outcome of interest (i.e, non-grain calorie consumption) for the treatment (T ) or control (C) states, in the period t (pre or post) for group i (BPL card holders (B) or others [N ] ). The second row is an equivalent way of expressing the double-difference estimator -it nets out the pre-period difference in levels between the treatment and control groups from the post-period difference, and attributes any residual change to the treatment.
However, since we can only identify the BPL card holders in the post-period, we estimate specifications in which we restrict the post-period sample to BPL card holders only (while keeping the entire pre-period sample which is a mix of BPL card holders and the others). Let α T and α C be the fraction of sampled households that do not own BPL cards in the treatment and control states respectively. Assume that these fractions remain the same in the pre and post-periods. Then our modified specification estimates the following double difference:
The second decomposition of the modified estimator (DD ) as shown in the equation above is instructive. Once again, the pre-period difference in levels between the treatment and control group is being netted out of the post-period difference except for the fact that the pre-period difference is for the entire sample, which is a mix of BPL card holders and the others.
We can see the source of potential bias in DD when we compare the above expressions.
While we estimate the same (conditional) post-period difference between the treatment and control group in both cases, we have different estimates of the pre-period difference.
We can formalize the bias as follows:
There are a number of things to note about this expression. First, note that α T , α C > 0. Similarly, we expect that E[Y households with BPL ration cards and households without ration cards in Chhattisgarh is equal to the difference in border districts. Although these are stringent conditions, we utilize border districts precisely because they are similar to Chhattisgarh.
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Given these conditions, we restrict the sample to border districts from states that are most different from Chhattisgarh. Specifically, we exclude border districts in Andhra
Pradesh and Maharashtra because they differ the most from Chhattisgarh in terms of household expenditure in the pre-survey; and we exclude border districts in Orissa and Uttar Pradesh because they differ the most in terms of protein consumption in the presurvey. Columns (6) and (7) of Table 5 report these estimates where we restrict the sample in the post period to those that do and do not have BPL cards. These results continue to suggest that households with ration cards that entitle them to the highest PDS subsidies are driving the change in protein consumption in Chhattisgarh.
Lastly, we re-estimate the specifications in Table 5 using total calorie consumption as the dependent variable in Table 6 . The estimates suggest that total calorie consumption did increase for households most likely to be eligible for the largest PDS subsidies; and we see that when we restrict the households in the post-period to only those entitle to large PDS subsidies, that calorie consumption similarly increases in Chhattisgarh relative to border districts.
Robustness Checks of the Baseline Specification
We perform a number of additional robustness checks for our baseline specification.
First, given the differential levels of treatment given the national reforms discussed in Section 3, we re-estimate the baseline specification in columns (1)-(3) of Table 7 , but respectively restrict the border districts to those from states where rations were larger than the provision by the central government (Andhra Pradesh and Orissa), to those from states where grains were not efficiently distributed and the increase in rations had very 19 In results not reported, we cannot reject the hypotheses that: (1) the share of households with BPL cards in Chhattisgarh is equal to the share in border districts in the post-survey, and (2) the average difference in protein consumption between households with proxied ration cards and households without proxied ration cards in Chhattisgarh is equal to the difference in border districts in the pre-survey.
little effect on actual PDS consumption (Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh), and to those where the national reforms resulted in larger PDS consumption, albeit by much less than in Chhattisgarh (Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra).
The baseline pattern continues to hold for each of these difference control groups.
The difference is largest and most precisely estimated when comparing Chhattisgarh to Andhra Pradesh and Orissa (column 1), where rations were already larger than the subsidy provided by the Central Government. However, consistent with the larger expansion of PDS subsidies in Chhattisgarh causing larger improvements in nutritional intake, households in Chhattisgarh had higher growth in protein consumption than border districts from Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh (column 2) and higher growth than border districts from Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra (column 3).
20
Second, Table 7 also estimates a slightly modified specification that allows treatment to vary based on pre-reform coverage of FPS's. In particular, utilizing the 1999/2000 survey, we proxy for FPS coverage by calculating the average household PDS rice consumption amongst households that consume a positive amount of PDS rice for each district. We define treatment as the average percentage difference between the size of the BPL entitlement and average PDS consumption of those who consume PDS food grains as follows: 
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Using this proxy of pre-reform FPS coverage, we re-estimate the baseline specification, 20 In specifications not reported, the results are qualitatively identical when we use all of Madhya Pradesh (the state from which Chhattisgarh was separated) and all of India as the control group. 21 The validity of the proxy is corroborated by the district containing the capital having one of the highest coverage of FPS's, and thus lowest levels of T reatment. Additionally, the five districts with the lowest FPS coverage and highest levels of T reatment have the highest percentage increase in PDS rice consumption.
but replace the interaction of the CT and P ost with the interaction of the T reatment and P ost. In this specification, we would expect γ > 0 if regions with a worse pre-reform coverage of FPS's improved their nutrition by more. The estimate is presented in column (4) of Table 7 , and further suggests that nutrition improved the most in districts that had the largest growth in FPS coverage.
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Third, we provide evidence that our results are not driven by improvements to other forms of public assistance. A number of other types of public assistance use criteria for eligibility that are similar to the criteria used for the PDS. These include Food For Work, Annapurna, Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS), and the Midday Meal Schemes, each of which supply households with food items and might alter diet choice.
In order to rule out the effect of changes to these programs, we restrict our sample to households that receive no other types of public support tracked by the NSSO consumer expenditure surveys. Column (5) of Table 7 demonstrates that it is unlikely that our results are an artifact of improvements in other forms of public assistance. The estimate is nearly identical in magnitude to the baseline estimates in Table 5 , and is more precise. (6) and (7) respectively. Consistent with the changes being caused by the increased in FPS coverage, the baseline patterns are much stronger in column (6) when we restrict the post-round only to households surveyed in 2004. Additionally, when we restrict the post-round to households surveyed in 2005 in column (7), the magnitude of the estimate is smaller and is less precisely estimated.
Fifth, we provide evidence that our results are not common to all newly-formed states in India. It is possible that newer and smaller states have fewer entrenched interests and smaller oversight costs. The better overall governance in these states could improve public services such as the PDS and result in higher protein consumption. If these factors are decisive, then we should expect to observe similar patterns of growth in protein consumption in the newly-formed states of Jharkhand and Uttarkhand. These states were formed at the same time as Chhattisgarh, were also separated from large and relatively poor states (Bihar and Uttarakhand, respectively), and are approximately the same size as Chhattisgarh.
Neither Jharkhand nor Uttarakhand, however, had higher growth in protein consumption than the districts bordering each state. Columns (8) and (9) of Table 7 report the differences in growth for Jharkhand and Uttarakhand, respectively, using the baseline specification. The estimate is positive in column (8) and negative in column (9), the magnitude of each is lower than the baseline estimates in Table 4 , and neither is statistically significant at conventional levels.
Additionally, Table 8 investigates matching methods to estimate the effects of the PDS reforms in Chhattisgarh on diet choice. One possibility is to utilize the differencein-differences matching estimator proposed by Smith and Todd (2005) and Blundell and Costa-Dias (2000) . This estimator is the difference between the matching estimator in Chhattisgarh and the matching estimator in border districts, which each use a post indicator to define treatment. The standard error is calculated with the bootstrap.
However, Abadie and Imbens (2008) demonstrate that standard errors calculated with the bootstrap fail to perform well in even the most simple matching estimator, which suggests such an estimator might be inappropriate. We instead use the matching estimator proposed by Abadie et al. (2004) to estimate treatment separately in Chhattisgarh and border districts, using the post indicator to define treatment and matching on the household-level control variables in the baseline specification. The change in nutrition in Chhattisgarh is presented in column (1) of Table 8 , and the change in border districts is presented in column (2). The difference between the two point estimates suggests that the increase in PDS subsidies in Chhattisgarh improved protein consumption by approximately 13.3% (the difference between 0.040 and -0.093). Although we cannot reliably estimate the standard error of that difference, the two 95-percent confidence intervals of the two estimates do not overlap, which suggests that, similar to the baseline estimates, protein consumption increased by more in Chhattisgarh than in border districts.
Additionally, in Table 9 , we estimate how overall expenditure changed in response to the increase in food price subsidies. Column (1) estimates the baseline specification utilizing the natural logarithm of total expenditure as the dependent variable; column (2) utilizes the natural logarithm of non-food expenditure as the dependent variable; and column (3) utilizes the natural logarithm of food expenditure as the dependent variable.
We find little evidence that expenditures changed differently in Chhattisgarh relative to border districts in any specifications.
However, it is important to note that the NSSO counts total rupees spent on consumption. So if a household consumed the same diet before and after an increase in PDS subsidies, the household would actually spend less on food. Given that households did not decrease their food expenditures by more than neighboring districts suggests that households spent at least some of the subsidy on more expensive, nutritious foods. This is corroborated by the increase in nutrition that is the main finding of the article.
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Finally, we provide evidence that the trends in protein consumption in districts that would become Chhattisgarh and border districts were similar prior to the PDS reforms in Chhattigarh. Table 10 demonstrates that growth in protein consumption only increased in Chhattisgarh relative to border districts after the PDS reforms were implemented.
Columns (1) Tables 5-8 , and none are statistically significant at conventional levels.
Column (7) of Table 10 combines all surveys conducted prior to the PDS reforms (50'th, 53'rd, and 54'th rounds) with the two surveys used in the baseline analysis (55'th and 61'st "thick" Rounds), and estimates the difference in protein consumption growth between Chhattisgarh and border districts for each period. The estimate for the period corresponding to Chhattisgarh's PDS reforms (.191 ) is similar to the baseline estimate, and there is still little difference in the growth of protein consumption between Chhattisgarh and border districts in periods before the PDS reforms. Additionally, despite the lack of precision of the estimates of the changes in protein consumption prior to the reforms in Chhattisgarh, we can reject the hypothesis of all interaction terms being equal at the 10 percent level (p-value of .057).
Conclusion
This article analyzes changes in diet choice in Chhattisgarh relative to border districts following PDS reforms that dramatically increased the availability of PDS food grains in the state. We find that relative to border districts, households in Chhattisgarh improved their nutritional intake. These results appear to be driven by households in Chhattisgarh that were most likely to be entitled to the largest food subsidies through PDS ration cards. We do not find evidence that households in Chhattisgarh that were the least likely to be entitled to PDS subsidies changed their diet relative to households in border districts. We also find that these changes in nutrient consumption are not a consequence of improvements to other forms of public assistance that target nutrition.
These results have implications for the recent improvement in PDS delivery in a number of Indian states (Khera 2011a) . Our findings suggest that this improvement could have been accompanied by an improvement in protein consumption. Our results also suggest that the proposed expansion of the PDS under the NFSA could help to reduce persistent malnourishment and food insecurity in the country.
The analysis still leaves a number of questions unanswered. We do not know whether other forms of aid might be more effective at improving nutrition than a large grains subsidy. Other forms of aid include subsidies for more nutritious foods, food stamps, and even cash subsidies. Although our results demonstrate that subsidizing staple grains can lead to other nutritional improvements, it is possible that direct subsidies for other types of foods may have a larger effect on nutritional outcomes. Chhattisgarh, in its most recent PDS reform in 2012, created a statewide subsidy for pulses after implementing a successful pilot program.
This article does not consider the potential adverse effects of PDS procurement of food grains on agricultural markets. Many commentators suggest that the governmentmandated Minimum Support Price (MSP) does more to provide income support to farmers than to stabilize food prices (Rakshit 2003) . Some studies suggest that these interventions in agricultural markets depress investment in the agricultural sector (Parikh, Ganesh-Kumar, and Darbha 2003) . The effects of government procurement on agricultural markets are likely to be magnified as a result of increased procurement under the NFSA. A number of policy makers are therefore concerned about the NFSA's implications for agricultural markets (Gulati, Gujral, and Nandakumar 2012) .
Lastly, we do not have a definitive explanation for why the effects of food assistance on nutrition in this setting differ from other settings. It is possible that the differences between our results and those of Tarozzi (2005) Iron ( For the differences presented in the third column, statistical significance is reported where *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, and * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. (1)- (3) estimate the baseline specification using the natural logarithm of total household consumption of protein over the past 30 days as the dependent variable; and columns (4)- (8) estimate the baseline specification for additional measures of total household nutrition. Control variables include an indicator equaling one if the household was surveyed in the post-period, the share of household members that are illiterate, indicators for whether the household resides in a rural area, for whether the household is self-employed, for whether the household belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, for whether the household belongs to an Other Backward Class, for whether the household head is illiterate, for whether the spouse of the head is illiterate, for whether the household head never attended school, for whether the spouse of the head never attended school, for whether the household has a spouse, and indicators for household religion (Muslim, Christian, Hindu/Sikh/Jain/Buddhist). For specifications without district fixed effects, control variables also include an indicator equaling one if the household resided in Chhattisgarh. Standard errors clustered by district are reported in parentheses. All specifications also report p-values of the coefficient on the interaction of the Chhattisgarh indicator and a Post variable using the wild cluster-bootstrap percentile-t method (P-Value BS) and randomization inference (P-Value RI) to estimate standard errors clustered by state. * Denotes significance at the 10% level; ** Denotes significance at the 5% level; *** Denotes significance at the 1% level. (1)- (5) restricts the sample to quintiles of the estimated probability of having a ration card based on demographic control variables used in the baseline specification; columns (6)- (8) respectively restrict the sample to households with a BPL ration card, APL ration card, and no ration card in the post-period. Columns (6)- (8) exclude households residing in the states that are the most dissimilar to Chhattisgarh in terms of protein consumption and expenditure-Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, and Uttar Pradesh. All specifications include district fixed effects and control variables. Control variables include an indicator equaling one if the household was surveyed in the postperiod, the share of household members that are illiterate, indicators for whether the household resides in a rural area, for whether the household is self-employed, for whether the household belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, for whether the household belongs to an Other Backward Class, for whether the household head is illiterate, for whether the spouse of the head is illiterate, for whether the household head never attended school, for whether the spouse of the head never attended school, for whether the household has a spouse, and indicators for household religion (Muslim, Christian, Hindu/Sikh/Jain/Buddhist). All specifications also report p-values of the coefficient on the interaction of the Chhattisgarh indicator and a Post variable using the wild cluster-bootstrap percentile-t method (PValue BS) and randomization inference (P-Value RI) (1)- (5) restricts the sample to quintiles of the estimated probability of having a ration card based on demographic control variables used in the baseline specification; columns (6)- (8) respectively restrict the sample to households with a BPL ration card, APL ration card, and no ration card in the post-period. Columns (6)-(8) exclude households residing in the states that are the most dissimilar to Chhattisgarh in terms of protein consumption and expenditure-Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, and Uttar Pradesh. All specifications include district fixed effects and control variables. Control variables include an indicator equaling one if the household was surveyed in the post-period, the share of household members that are illiterate, indicators for whether the household resides in a rural area, for whether the household is self-employed, for whether the household belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, for whether the household belongs to an Other Backward Class, for whether the household head is illiterate, for whether the spouse of the head is illiterate, for whether the household head never attended school, for whether the spouse of the head never attended school, for whether the household has a spouse, and indicators for household religion (Muslim, Christian, Hindu/Sikh/Jain/Buddhist). All specifications also report p-values of the coefficient on the interaction of the Chhattisgarh indicator and a Post variable using the wild cluster-bootstrap percentile-t method (P-Value BS) and randomization inference (P-Value RI) to estimate standard errors clustered by state. Standard errors clustered by district are reported in parentheses; * Denotes significance at the 10% level; ** Denotes significance at the 5% level; *** Denotes significance at the 1% level. (3) re-estimate the baseline specification but utilize different subsets of households for the comparison region. Column (1) utilizes households in border districts from Andhra Pradesh and Orissa; column (2) utilizes households in border districts from Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh; and column (3) utilizes households in border districts from Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. Column (4) allows treatment to vary based on the pre-existing coverage of the PDS. Column (5) re-estimates the baseline specification, but restricts the sample to households that do not receive any other public benefit tracked by the NSSO. Columns (6) and (7) re-estimate the baseline specification but restrict the sample in the post-survey to households surveyed in 2005, respectively. Columns (8) and (9) report placebo specifications which estimate the difference in consumption growth between the other newly-formed states of Jharkhand and Uttarakhand and districts bordering each state. All specifications include district fixed effects and control variables. Control variables include an indicator equaling one if the household was surveyed in the post-period, the share of household members that are illiterate, indicators for whether the household resides in a rural area, for whether the household is self-employed, for whether the household belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, for whether the household belongs to an Other Backward Class, for whether the household head is illiterate, for whether the spouse of the head is illiterate, for whether the household head never attended school, for whether the spouse of the head never attended school, for whether the household has a spouse, and indicators for household religion (Muslim, Christian, Hindu/Sikh/Jain/Buddhist). All specifications also report p-values of the coefficient on the interaction of the Chhattisgarh indicator and a Post variable using the wild cluster-bootstrap percentile-t method (P-Value BS) and randomization inference (P-Value RI) to estimate standard errors clustered by state. Standard errors clustered by district are reported in parentheses;
* Denotes significance at the 10% level; ** Denotes significance at the 5% level; *** Denotes significance at the 1% level. Abadie et al. (2004) . The estimates use the bias-corrected and robust options, and utilizes four matches. Treatment is defined as the Post variable, and the control variables used in the baseline empirical specification are the matching variables. Specifically, the matching variables are an indicator equaling one if the household was surveyed in the post-period, the share of household members that are illiterate, indicators for whether the household resides in a rural area, for whether the household is self-employed, for whether the household belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, for whether the household belongs to an Other Backward Class, for whether the household head is illiterate, for whether the spouse of the head is illiterate, for whether the household head never attended school, for whether the spouse of the head never attended school, for whether the household has a spouse, and indicators for household religion (Muslim, Christian, Hindu/Sikh/Jain/Buddhist). Most importantly, the estimated 95-percent confidence intervals of the two estimates do not overlap.
* Denotes significance at the 10% level; ** Denotes significance at the 5% level; *** Denotes significance at the 1% level. was surveyed in the post-period, the share of household members that are illiterate, indicators for whether the household resides in a rural area, for whether the household is self-employed, for whether the household belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, for whether the household belongs to an Other Backward Class, for whether the household head is illiterate, for whether the spouse of the head is illiterate, for whether the household head never attended school, for whether the spouse of the head never attended school, for whether the household has a spouse, and indicators for household religion (Muslim, Christian, Hindu/Sikh/Jain/Buddhist). All specifications also report p-values of the coefficient on the interaction of the Chhattisgarh indicator and a Post variable using the wild cluster-bootstrap percentile-t method (P-Value BS) and randomization inference (P-Value RI) to estimate standard errors clustered by state. Standard errors clustered by district are reported in parentheses;
* Denotes significance at the 10% level; ** Denotes significance at the 5% level; *** Denotes significance at the 1% level. difference-in-differences estimate for non-grains consumption in periods prior to the PDS reforms in Chhattisgarh. Columns (1)-(2) present estimates of the difference-in-differences Round); columns (3)-(4) present estimates of the difference-in-differences between 1997 ; columns (5)-(6) present estimates of the difference-in-differences between ; and column (7) pools all surveys and estimates changes in consumption in Chhattisgarh relative to border districts at different time periods. Control variables include an indicator equaling one if the household was surveyed in the post-period, the share of household members that are illiterate, indicators for whether the household resides in a rural area, for whether the household is self-employed, for whether the household belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, for whether the household belongs to an Other Backward Class, for whether the household head is illiterate, for whether the spouse of the head is illiterate, for whether the household head never attended school, for whether the spouse of the head never attended school, and for whether the household has a spouse. In specifications not including district fixed effects, the control variables also include an indicator equaling one if the household resided in Chhattisgarh. All specifications also report p-values of the coefficient on the interaction of the Chhattisgarh indicator and a Post variable using the wild cluster-bootstrap percentile-t method (PValue BS) and randomization inference (P-Value RI) to estimate standard errors clustered by state; in column 7 the p-value is for a test of the baseline estimate equaling zero (as opposed to pre-existing trends). Standard errors clustered by district are reported in parentheses;
* Denotes significance at the 10% level; ** Denotes significance at the 5% level; *** Denotes significance at the 1% level. (1)- (3) report the difference-in-differences estimate of how much more monthly per capita expenditure grew in Chhattisgarh than in border districts for cereals producers between 1999/2000 and 2004/5. Column (1) estimates a sparse specification including only the variable of interest and lower-order terms; column (2) adds district fixed effects; and column (3) adds control variables. Columns (3)-(4) report estimates of the baseline specification, but clusters the standarad errors at the state level. Column (3) includes only Chhattisgarh and border districts; column (4) includes all of India. Control variables include an indicator equaling one if the household was surveyed in the post-period, the share of household members that are illiterate, indicators for whether the household resides in a rural area, for whether the household is self-employed, for whether the household belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, for whether the household belongs to an Other Backward Class, for whether the household head is illiterate, for whether the spouse of the head is illiterate, for whether the household head never attended school, for whether the spouse of the head never attended school, for whether the household has a spouse, and indicators for household religion (Muslim, Christian, Hindu/Sikh/Jain/Buddhist). For specifications not including fixed effects, control variables also include an indicator equal to one if the household resides in Chhattisgarh. Columns (1)-(3) report standard errors clustered by district in parentheses; columns (4)-(5) report standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.
Appendix
* Denotes significance at the 10% level; ** Denotes significance at the 5% level; *** Denotes significance at the 1% level. 
